Challenges in Vehicle Systems Resilience

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Since the introduction of the first microprocessor-based systems into mass-produced vehicles in the 1980s, the electronics content of automobiles has continued to grow. Future trends including moves towards autonomous vehicles and connected cars will continue this growth. Historically disciplines such as reliability analysis and systems engineering have been used to develop robust electronic systems and more recently functional safety as approached in ISO 26262 builds on these foundations. However the future growth means that it is important to consider the holistic issue of resilience of electronic systems with a cross-disciplinary approach incorporating wider issues including cybersecurity and availability properties.

Introduction

While the history of electrical and electronic systems in vehicles is nearly as old the car itself, it was in the 1980s that significant growth in the electronics content of mass-produced vehicles first started. The 1980s saw the introduction of tailpipe emissions regulations, initially in the USA, that required the engine to be electronically managed in order to meet the required targets.

The growth in electronic systems has continued unabated; the trend is typically that advanced systems are first introduced into luxury vehicles and then become standard fitment in mass-market vehicles once the technology becomes accepted and commoditized. The following table shows for each recent decade a key electronic system that has started to be fitted to mass-market vehicles as standard and the motivation for this. (Table 1)

Various statistics are quoted for the electronics content of vehicles but typical estimates are that between 20% and 40% of the value of the bill of materials in a vehicle is in its electrical and electronic systems (depending on the market and brand of the vehicle) with around 100 computer systems. Some sources cite that vehicles now contain more software than a Boeing 787 Dreamliner although in the author’s opinion this may not be comparing like-for-like. (Figure 1)

In the future the major trends will be the “connected car” and greater use of driver assist systems leading to deployment of systems with higher degrees of automation and eventually fully autonomous vehicles.

Development of the “connected car” is proceeding in three directions. Firstly, vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-infrastructure communications continue to be developed and deployed in some markets (notably the long-standing use in Japan, and a recent legislative mandate in the USA). Secondly, some vehicle manufacturers already embed a cellular modem for remote diagnostics and service, and the European e-call requirements will mandate fitting of such technology.

However the third significant growth area is the use of consumer devices in the vehicle that effectively make the car an “always on” internet node due to 3G/4G wireless connectivity. Many manufacturers are providing seamless integration and “hand off” between consumer devices and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>System</th>
<th>Motivation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>Engine management</td>
<td>Emissions legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>Restraints e.g. airbags</td>
<td>Market forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>Electronic stability control</td>
<td>Legislation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010s</td>
<td>Driver assist e.g. AEB</td>
<td>Market forces e.g. EuroNCAP</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Figure 1 Which has the most software?
Apps in the car; and also the facility for a wireless hotspot in the car.

The safety and reliability of these electronic systems has always been a consideration for the industry but these parallel developments of connected cars and greater use of autonomy means that ensuring the resilience of these systems is now a top priority for the industry.

What is Vehicle Systems Resilience?

HORIBA MIRA is using the term “vehicle systems resilience” to refer to the properties or attributes of the mission-critical electronic systems used on vehicles. As shown in Figure 2, traditionally development of all vehicle systems (not only the electronic systems) has considered their reliability using failure mode avoidance techniques such as failure mode and effect analysis (FMEA) and fault tree analysis (FTA). Many vehicle engineering lifecycles use a “V” model or waterfall model derived from systems engineering where high level requirements derived from product attributes are cascaded down through successive levels of architectural design until a suitable level of detail for implementation is reached. The implemented elements are then integrated and verified in a stepwise fashion to demonstrate confidence in the completed product.

More recently functional safety has become an integral part of the development lifecycle. In its widest sense, functional safety is the part of overall system safety concerned with demonstrating that technology-based systems operate correctly in response to their inputs (and therefore do not generate a potentially unsafe condition by incorrect operation). Specifically in the automotive industry, the international standard ISO 26262 is concerned with avoiding hazards that could result from malfunctioning behaviour of electrical or electronic systems.

The scope of ISO 26262 is therefore narrower in comparison to some other practices in functional safety, since it is only concerned with the requirements for design of systems based upon electrical and electronic technology. It is not concerned with how to design safely other elements such as hydraulic components even though, by definition, these also come into the scope of a wider “functional safety” activity.

ISO 26262 introduces requirements for rigour in the engineering process that go beyond the base level of requirements such as those regulated by a Quality Management System. One of the key reasons for this is that, due to the complexity of the electronic systems, it is not possible to demonstrate that a product is “correct” simply by testing it at the end of the product development lifecycle and applying a “fly-fix-fly” approach to any issues found. Instead a process of building confidence into the system is required through applying the principles of systems engineering and reliability analysis to understand the consequences of malfunction of the system, the causes of malfunction and to ensure adequate defences against them are designed into the system. ISO 26262, in common with other functional safety standards, uses the term “safety integrity” to refer to the rigour required in...
design of an electronic system. ISO 26262 is also based on the classical “V” model in systems engineering as shown in Figure 3.

However in reality many practitioners focus on malfunctions – avoiding random faults in hardware or systematic faults in the system, hardware or software design – rather than on malfunctioning behaviour. We will return later in this paper to consider some important additional factors that are part of this wider term of malfunctioning behaviour.

Since the initial publication of ISO 26262 in 2011, the industry has taken up the challenge and functional safety is now a core discipline in the design of vehicles and their components. However the two key growth aspects of autonomous functions and connected vehicles means that the required robustness of vehicles is a wider issue than safety integrity alone. We consider two of the key implications of these technologies to demonstrate the need to consider resilience, not only safety integrity.

**Fail Operational Behaviour**

In ISO 26262, there are a number of unwritten assumptions including

- The driver is part of the control loop of electronic systems and whether the driver can react to mitigate the outcome of hazards is considered during the hazard analysis activity.
- Fail-silent behaviour (i.e. to remove electronically-controlled functions) is generally considered as a suitable final reaction to system malfunction.
- “Drive by wire” functions in steering and braking retain a mechanical fall-back in case of total failure of the electronically controlled functions.

These assumptions are reasonable for a vehicle and systems where the driver is expected to be monitoring and controlling functionality on a full-time basis. These

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SAE Level</th>
<th>Degree of automation</th>
<th>Driver in loop?</th>
<th>Example feature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 – no automation</td>
<td>Warning only</td>
<td>Yes – full time</td>
<td>Lane Departure Warning (LDW)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – driver assistance</td>
<td>Speed only or steering only</td>
<td>Yes – full time</td>
<td>Lane Keep Assist (LKA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – partial automation</td>
<td>Speed and steering</td>
<td>Yes – full time</td>
<td>Traffic Jam Assist (TJA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 – conditional automation</td>
<td>Full automation of specific driving tasks</td>
<td>Yes – part time, expected to respond to request to intervene within a defined period of time</td>
<td>Highway chauffeur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 – high automation</td>
<td>Full automation of specific driving tasks</td>
<td>No – under defined constraints</td>
<td>Automated valet parking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – full automation</td>
<td>Full automation under all environmental and traffic conditions</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Self-driving car that can execute a complete arbitrary journey</td>
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assumptions extend to some of the automated functions already being introduced, at least in systems defined as Level 1 or Level 2 functions in accordance with the SAE taxonomy of autonomous functions[2], where the systems support some aspects of driving but the driver is expected to be in full-time control. Examples of this are seen in functions where the driver is still expected to keep hold of the steering wheel such as Lane Keep Assist (LKA), a Level 1 function, and Traffic Jam Assist (TJA), a Level 2 function. A summary of the SAE Levels and example features is shown in Table 2.

As more advanced autonomous systems are introduced, the need for availability properties or “fail operational” behaviour is emerging. “Fail operational” behaviour means that there are circumstances where it is not appropriate to remove the electronic function in case of malfunction and instead continued operation or “availability” over a defined period of time is required.

Example requirements for such behaviour include

• An electrical power steering system (EPAS) used as an actuator for a Level 3 lane-change function must have availability over the typical time required to complete such a manoeuvre;
• A Level 3 system might require to hand-over to the driver, and if the driver does not respond in a timely manner initiate a safe stop (“automatic emergency landing”);
• An arbitrary journey conducted “end to end” under full autonomy requires availability to complete the mission.

It is therefore acknowledged that future features associated with SAE Level 3 and above driver assist functions (leading up to full autonomy) have requirements for availability and to “fail operational”.

There are two principal solutions emerging to fail operational requirements. One solution is to use existing systems as a back-up, for example since electronic stability control (ESC) permits individual wheel braking this could be used for a short-term backup if EPAS fails although such a solution is likely to only be feasible to bring the vehicle to a safe stop in a relatively short time window.

The alternative solution is to provide some form of redundancy within the systems themselves so that they can continue operating in a defined manner in the presence of one or more failures. In ISO 26262 Edition 2 it is proposed to give some consideration to these types of fail operational requirements but these are currently at the level of hardware and software solutions to achieve a defined availability. Further guidance is needed to identify how this availability is identified and defined particularly in the areas of:

• Performing hazard analysis and risk assessment; we consider that a “layered” approach is required incorporating safety of the intended functionality (i.e. non-faulted behaviour), malfunctioning behaviour, and performance of a backup system (e.g. an “automatic land” function). Such an analysis may therefore result in different sets of safety requirements and attributes (integrity, availability) for the different layers.
• Methods that can be used to specify and evaluate architectures required for fail operational requirements. Guidance is needed at the system architecture level as well as at the level of some of the emerging hardware and software solutions e.g. microcontroller architectures. For example, for an EPAS that needs availability for the duration of an autonomous mission, should a classical “2 out of 3” redundant architecture be used?
• Specifying hardware targets (metrics) against random hardware failures. The current approach in ISO 26262 is based on a classical approach to hardware reliability but the methods and targets may need revisiting for availability requirements.

Cybersecurity

Another increasingly important aspect of resilience is cybersecurity. The electronic systems in modern vehicles are considered to be cyber-physical systems – that is, systems of collaborating computational elements controlling physical entities. Due to the fact that vehicles and their systems have increasing levels of external connectivity, risk to cyber-physical systems may arise due to an attack exploiting a vulnerability in these connections. Cybersecurity refers to avoiding risk to cyber-physical systems due to an attack. Note that while cybersecurity often assumes malicious activity, accidental activity should also be considered (e.g. an enthusiastic vehicle owner who tries to make their own wireless connection to a vehicle system which has an unforeseen consequence).

Security of IT-based systems is a well-established discipline and is an important part of securing “connected car” applications. Figure 4 shows a typical application where remote unlocking of a vehicle is possible either by the vehicle owner using a smartphone App, or by making contact with a service centre that can issue a remote unlocking command. In this concept, all of the assets shown are potential attack points for an attacker for example by:
Challenges in Vehicle Systems Resilience

- Impersonating the owner calling the centre;
- Social engineering of the service centre personnel to gain access to credentials;
- Conducting a “man in the middle” attack on the communications between the service centre and the vehicle, or between the smartphone and the vehicle;
- Introducing a compromised App into the smartphone.

When evaluating cybersecurity risk, the severity of consequences and the likelihood of mounting a successful attack need to be considered. Consequences of a cybersecurity attack may include loss of privacy, financial loss to owners, operators or manufacturers of vehicles, loss of reputation, operational limitations and safety concerns. The likelihood of mounting a successful attack depends on a number of factors including whether a potential attacker needs access to specific information about the system and specialist tools or resources, and the time needed to develop the exploit [3].

In terms of approaches for protecting cyber-physical systems, established IT security principles need to continue to be applied to assets such as back office systems and App development. However specialized techniques are needed for in-vehicle aspects where the security countermeasures need to be scaled to align with the requirements of real-time embedded control systems. It should also be noted that many aspects of research into vehicle cybersecurity are focussing on the external interfaces and how to secure this against attack; however this must be seen as the first line of defence. Given the continually developing nature of cybersecurity threats, a “defence in depth” strategy that also covers aspects such as internal communications buses in the vehicle is also needed to help defend the system against “zero day” exploits – once a vulnerability in an interface is discovered, it is immediately exploitable until an update is applied to resolve it.

The automotive industry has recognized the need for standards to address cybersecurity development of embedded systems and has recently published an SAE Recommended Practice J3061™, Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Vehicle Systems [4]. A key aspect of this document is that it recommends a lifecycle for cybersecurity engineering that is derived from the ISO 26262 safety lifecycle and can also be aligned with it. This recognizes that functional safety and cybersecurity share many common aspects and that certain activities need to be harmonized, for example a cybersecurity attack may be the cause of a functional safety hazard. The J3061™ lifecycle is shown in Figure 5. More recently a joint standardization activity between SAE and ISO is underway, seeking to combine proposals from SAE, VSA and JSAE into a new vehicle cybersecurity standard. This standard is expected to be published around 2019.

A further important aspect of cybersecurity concerns testing and evaluation. The industry needs to work with trusted partners who can evaluate and demonstrate cybersecurity concerns and solutions in safe and secure environments, rather than using public infrastructure for studies and demonstrations. This will require the
development of appropriate capabilities for conducting research into potential vehicle vulnerabilities in a confidential manner, and enabling evaluation of real vehicles and systems in a secured environment. Typical requirements for such evaluations could include:

- A quarantined environment where resilience evaluation can be conducted using realistic infrastructure (e.g. cellular communications) without disrupting public services;
- The ability to exercise vehicles and their systems in realistic operating conditions (e.g. driving at speed, cornering with a stability control intervention) without the use of public roads;
- The ability to combine multiple aspects of resilience during an evaluation e.g. combining electromagnetic interference with exploitation of a security vulnerability;
- Conducting evaluations according to a well-defined code of ethics e.g. in terms of confidentiality.

Other Aspects of Resilience

Besides the emerging aspects noted above, there are a number of other factors that contribute to resilience of systems. These include:

- Human interactions: for example ensuring that clear and understandable information on the operation of a system is given to the driver, that such information is not distracting, and that the interfaces are defined in such a way that the possibility of mis-operation by the driver is avoided.
- The behaviour of mechanical systems as a cause of the behaviour of electronic systems: some practitioners take a very narrow view when applying ISO 26262 but it is important to consider all external interfaces and the influence that these may have on correct operation of the system. Both of these aspects are considered to be contributors to “malfunctioning behaviour” even if they are sometimes overlooked in a very narrow interpretation of functional safety.

Conclusions

Systems engineering and reliability analysis techniques have provided a strong foundation for many of the challenges faced in the current generation of vehicles, as reflected in practices such as ISO 26262. To face the challenges of future vehicles, including connected cars and greater use of autonomy, a cross-disciplinary approach based on the concept of resilience is required. This encompasses many of the attributes required including safety integrity, availability, reliability and cybersecurity.
Challenges in Vehicle Systems Resilience

References


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